



## Relationship between Age, Experience, Rank, Educational Level, Mutiny Proneness and Disobedience among Nigerian Army Personnel

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### ABSTRACT

*Among scholars, there has been equivocality on the influence of demographics on deviant behaviours among workers in organisations. How this would play out in a military organisation among its personnel motivated this study. Using randomly selected 422 men and officers of randomly selected two divisions of Nigerian Army, the study investigated the relationship between age, experience, rank, educational level, mutiny proneness and disobedience among Nigerian Army personnel. Using 3-way factorial analysis, it was revealed that there was no significant influence of these variables, either singularly or jointly on disobedience, thereby upholding the controversy on the influence of demographics on workers deviant behaviour (Disobedience, in this case). The results were discussed in line with the propositions of Social Exchange Theory, while it was noted in conclusion that the predictive influence of these variables still exist in the presence of other dispositional factors as noted elsewhere. Suggestions for more psychological involvement in recruiting exercise was made, and regular counselling be made to avoid any form of deviant behaviour among military personnel.*

## INTRODUCTION

“On June 22, 1941, the 2nd Panzer Army of Germany’s Third Reich invaded Russia under General Heinz Guderian’s command. Guderian was a highly trained, wealthy, respected member of a tight-knit military family. His father was a prominent commander; Heinz served in the General Staff during the First World War and was central to German military thought in the interwar years (Koch, 2003). The general reached the Moscow area on December 1 (Biesinger, 2006), where frigid weather battered his forces. While Adolf Hitler’s orders dictated that German forces in Russia were to hold fast, Guderian believed withdrawal strategically was necessary. He met with Hitler on December 20 to ask for an exception. Hitler refused, ordering Guderian to dig in. Guderian subsequently disobeyed Hitler’s order and led a retreat, reportedly telling his commander: “I will lead my army in these unusual circumstances in such a manner that I can answer for it to my conscience” (Evans, 2009).

Existing research struggles to explain cases like Guderian’s. Scholarship tends to focus on militaries’ obedience to civilian authority, disciplinary outcomes for low-ranking soldiers (Richards, 2018), or aggregate predictors of disobedience, such as insufficient training or lack of social cohesion (Castillo, 2014; Manekin, 2013; Rose, 1982). Yet, insubordination like Guderian’s — an act of strategy and conscience rooted in obligation to the men under his command — implies different causal processes. An overarching lack of training or poor physical conditions might explain patterns of civilian abuse or the prevalence of desertion. But, why do highly trained, experienced soldiers disobey certain operational orders even as they follow others?

Individual disobedience may express anything from personal opportunism, to strategic brilliance, to principled resistance. However, disobedience such as Guderian’s can also be considered conceptually distinct from mere insubordination; it is based on both military and social norms that officers feel obligated to observe because of their positions.

In order to study officer-level disobedience, we build a theory using in-depth case studies of disobedience — that is, refusals to obey direct orders from the chain of command— by well-trained, high-ranking, experienced officers.

When these factors coincide, contradictory imperatives may lead to disobedience. Studies of 10 further cases, highlighted in an online appendix, clarify the conceptual boundaries of the phenomenon and imply a large, if difficult to empirically identify, universe of similar cases. Understanding officers’ behaviour requires examining command structures, personnel, and threat environments, in addition to grasping how orders interact with the overlapping and often opposing imperatives rooted in soldiers’ social networks. Examining the three factors specified earlier reveals how competing incentives and obligations — particularly vis-a-vis networks beyond the chain of command — shape officers’ behaviour (Koehler et al., 2016; McLauchlin, 2014).

Studying officers’ disobedience builds on studies that link military cohesion and doctrine to outcomes such as battlefield effectiveness, military behaviour, and strategic innovation. Centering individuals’ disobedience highlights a tension between imperatives for adherence to the military organization and the necessity of internal dissent (Farrell, 2010; Murray, 2009; Russell, 2011; Zirakzadeh, 2002). Prior studies of disobedience do not adequately explain when and how officers become likely to disobey orders, focusing instead on identifying general motivations, such as poor leadership, questionable battlefield objectives, and cultural tendencies (Mantle, 2006; Orbach, 2017). Huntington (1957), for instance, identifies key situations in which individual officers might be justified in disobeying orders. Even if we take Huntington’s scenarios as predictors, though, his work offers few ways to empirically identify critical junctures or to forecast how soldiers will decide to act.

Other scholarship focuses on how military organizations’ internal structures and modes of oversight influence discipline (Richards, 2018). For instance, Feaver (2005) argues that military agents work when monitored by

civilians and shirk when unsupervised, emphasizing that preference alignment between military agents and civilian principals make shirking less likely. By empirically focusing on well-trained, loyal career officers' disobedience, our relational approach theorizes hard cases where principals' and agents' preferences are largely aligned and disagreement is an aberration. Moreover, by focusing on officers' responses to specific orders in particular contexts, we showcase how the dynamic nature of conflict produces evolving and often unpredictable agent preferences. This perspective is only possible given our ability to leverage extensive primary-source documents to build fine-grained reconstructions of each case.

Similarly, scholarship on disciplinary breakdown does not adequately explain acts of disobedience on the level (individual) or of the type (normative). However, it does provide important insights into the role of the relational environment and local context in fueling disciplinary outcomes. Extensive research examines the causes of *collective* disciplinary breakdowns, emphasizing links between physical conditions, deteriorating morale, and outcomes like desertion and mutiny (Gal, 1985; Rose, 1982). Subsequent research has emphasized that soldiers' links to co-ethnics or co-locals in their units heavily influence their incentives to desert (Albrecht and Koehler, 2018; Bearman, 1991; McLauchlin, 2010, 2014). Others underscore relationships between material incentives in recruitment, indiscipline, and civilian abuse (Humphreys and Weinstein, 2006; Weinstein, 2007).

Examining individual officers' disobedience from a relational standpoint recognizes intra-military social dynamics' influence on soldiers' behaviour while highlighting those individuals' agency and multivocality (their concurrent roles in distinct webs of relationships). This analytical pivot also allows us to build on extensive micro- and meso-level work on civil wars and counter-insurgency which demonstrates, for instance, that the environments in which soldiers operate and their identifications with multiple social

lnetworks influence organizational structure, defection, factionalization, and remobilization. (Parkinson and Zaks, 2018)

Relational approaches have yet to be applied to officers' disobedience. While past work often assumes that soldiers become unquestioningly loyal to military organizations, arguing that "discipline would destroy the loyalties and habits of behaviour that soldiers brought with them into the army from society" (Rosen, 1995), scholars have increasingly challenged this prior (Albrecht and Ohl, 2016; Manekin, 2017). Indeed, while unquestioning obedience has been seen as crucial to unit cohesion, battlefield effectiveness, and harmonious civil-military relations (Brooks and Stanley, 2007; King, 2006; Siebold, 2007), it rarely (if ever) obtains. By shifting the unit of analysis and emphasizing individual officers' agency, we nuance the processes undergirding individual-level decision-making and strategic choice, providing a crucial complement to existing theories of both state and non-state military actors.

Scholarship on military organizations' social embeddedness underlines the necessity of examining network micro-structures in order to understand soldiers' behaviour. Broadly, scholars have identified social factors such as kinship (Parkinson, 2013; Viterna, 2013), associational memberships (Petersen, 2001), past military service (Hundman, 2016; Lyall, 2010; Parkinson, 2016), regional-level ties (Bearman, 1991; Daly, 2016; McLauchlin, 2014, 2015), and other "everyday" relationships (Kim and Crabb, 2014) as influencing outcomes of interest. These findings imply the existence of multiple, non-linear processes influencing soldiers' decision-making. Hence the impetus to study the influence of sociodemographic factors, separately and in the presence of certain psychological dynamics, on propensity and motivation to disobey among military personnel in Nigeria.

Military individuals thus consider orders through multiple frames. When an officer receives an order, they interpret both its

content (“do X”) and its social resonance (“What will doing X mean?”). They may conclude that their multiplex identifications demand divergent responses to the order. Any social network may resonate with orders, leading to the possibility of perceiving pressures to respond in contradictory ways. An officer’s military role demands obedience to a chain of command, receiving an order that they interpret as problematic in other social domains produces tension between the officer’s multiplex roles. We label this process of generating role strain “activation.”

When activation occurs, some subset of the officer’s other ties become newly salient to the military role in which they receive their orders. In other words, at least one of the officer’s military identities comes into conflict with a competing identification, generating episodic strain in the military role that can lead to disobedience. However, “identity” is not permanent or unchangeable; it is embedded in and generated by networks of dynamic social ties. In the present study, the sociodemographic considered are seen as different dimensions of social (group) networks that are likely to influence “activation”, this time, disobedience.

Activation generates strain in an officer’s role by bringing two such sets of ties into conflict — the officer decides how to respond to military orders creatively by drawing on the rules and skills of multiple, distinct networks. Conflicts between multiple strong loyalties can lead to a need to adjudicate irreconcilable imperatives. An actor’s multiple identifications may not be compatible or even mutually comprehensible, which is why the process of adjudication is critical. Membership in a social network does not necessarily involve intrinsic acceptance of fixed authority, norms, or behavioural standards. Rather, the individual’s need to resolve the tangled, contradictory pressures and information presented by each network makes disobedience conceivable and potentially legitimate to the commander. The activation of multiple identifications and the resulting role strain produce the conditions of possibility for disobedience.

Role strain can produce disobedience but we cannot precisely predict how specific brokers will perceive orders, interpret multiple domains’ demands, or ultimately decide to act. Given the infinite universe of political contexts and commands, our theory does not explain exactly which orders will activate particular network ties, which modes of identification will matter to a given decision, or how an individual will adjudicate between competing identity claims. However, past research and the case work we present in the online appendix suggest several kinds of social domains that would be most likely to compete with strong military ties: (1) identifications with past military units; (2) identifications with home region, city, or village; (3) civilian communities in general; (4) kinship and marriage ties; and (5) ethnic identification. We use our case studies to explore these possibilities but leave deeper empirical exploration and hypothesis testing for future work.

## Literature review

### Social Exchange Theory

Social exchange theory (SET) is among the most influential conceptual paradigms for understanding workplace behaviour. Although different views of social exchange have emerged, theorists agree that social exchange involves a series of interactions that generate obligations (Emerson, 1976).

Social exchange theory is not a single theory but it is better understood as a family of conceptual models (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). In this regard, all social exchange theories share a number of common features. All social exchange theories treat social life as involving a series of sequential transactions between two or more parties (Mitchell, Cropanzano, & Quisenberry, 2012). Resources are exchanged through a process of reciprocity, whereby one party tends to repay the good (or sometimes bad) deeds of another party (Gergen, 1969; Gouldner, 1960). The quality of these exchanges is sometimes influenced by the relationship between the actor and the target (Blau, 1964). Economic exchanges tend to be *quid pro quo* and involve less trust and more active monitoring, whereas social exchange



tends to be open-ended and involve greater trust and flexibility (Organ, 1988; 1990).

Building on these straightforward ideas, social exchange theory is one of the most enduring and widely used conceptual frameworks (Cropanzano & Mitchell, 2005). At one time or another, many of the most important topics in organizational behaviour have been analyzed through the lens of social exchange theory. For example, organizational citizenship behaviours (Organ, 1988; 1990), commitment (Bishop, Scott, & Burroughs, 2000), justice (Tepper & Taylor, 2003), and both supervisory and organizational support (Ladd & Henry, 2000) have been fruitfully explored using this model.

While there are many variants of social exchange, most contemporary models in organizational behaviour share a few common features: (a) an actor's initial treatment toward a target individual, (b) a target's reciprocal responses (both attitudinal and behaviour) to the action, and (c) relationship formation. The social exchange process begins when an organizational actor or perpetrator, usually a supervisor or co-worker, treats a target individual in a positive or negative fashion (Farrell & Rusbult, 1981; Rusbult, Farrell, Rogers, & Mainous, 1988;). For clarity, we refer to these initial behaviours as *initiating actions*. Positive initiating actions may include activities such as providing organizational support (Riggle, Edmondson, & Hansen, 2009) or justice (Cropanzano & Rupp, 2008). Negative initiating actions might involve abusive supervision, incivility (Pearson, Andersson, & Porath, 2005), or bullying (Ryaner & Keashly, 2005).

In response to the initiating action, the target, often a subordinate or co-worker, may then choose to reciprocate this treatment with good or bad behaviour of his/her own (Eisenberger, Cotterell, & Marvel, 1987; Gergen, 1969; Gouldner, 1960). Collectively, we refer to these behaviours as *reciprocating responses*. Social exchange theory predicts that, in reaction to positive initiating actions, targets will tend to reply in kind by engaging in

more positive reciprocating responses and/or fewer negative reciprocating responses. Speaking loosely, these responses can be broadly organized into two types – relational responses and behavioural responses. Notably, one type often causes the other.

Military organizations are hierarchical, institutionalized, routinized social networks. The rules, social norms, codes of conduct, and laws that govern the behaviour of individual soldiers (who occupy roles) and groups of soldiers (who form clusters of ties) constitute roles in the military domain. For example, military socialization influences whether soldiers obey orders (Green, 2016, 2018) and the practices they adopt (Cohen, 2016; Green, 2017; Wood, 2009; Wood and Toppelberg, 2017). Codes of conduct and legal frameworks determine whether soldiers' roles *within the military domain* obligate them to refuse immoral or illegal orders (Osiel, 1999). However, individuals within the military vary in the degree to which they prioritize these obligations.

This is because “the military” is only one subset of soldiers' social contexts; they do not operate in a social vacuum. Soldiers identify with multiple social groups and, correspondingly, have loyalties to multiple in-military groups, as well as to groups outside the military. They are not only military personnel loyal to their statutory superiors; they are also family members, comrades, colleagues, and servants of the nation. Even in the rare case that a commander knows no life outside the military, they will still be subject to potentially conflicting imperatives from competing *intra-military* groups and pressures, such as when receiving illegal orders (Osiel, 1999). Seen through this framework, soldiers judge whether orders flowing through hierarchical command structures in the military domain are “just,” “rational,” or “reasonable,” both as subordinates and as actors immersed in overlapping, potentially contradictory, sets of social relations. Even individuals who are loyal, professional, and committed members of an organization may critique or even occasionally subvert “the prevailing values, strategy, system

of authority, and so on” (Ashforth and Mael, 1989).

## **Deviant Workplace Behaviour and Demographics**

Demographics play a pivotal role in the potential for deviant workplace behaviour. Demographic dissimilarity, which has been explained by Barsness et al., (2005), as the degree of dissimilarity between an individual and other organizational members on various demographic characteristics such as gender, age and race dissimilarity, has been stated as the starting point for deviant workplace behaviour. Hence, it is important for the managers to hire likeminded employees.

Various research studies results revealed that men are more likely to commit workplace deviance than women; young people are more likely to contribute in deviance in comparison to older people; short tenured employees behave more unethically than workers who have stayed longer in an organization; highly qualified employees with many degrees behave ethically than those with less education; permanent employees engaged less in deviant behaviours than temporary or on contract based employees (Appelbaum, et al., 2007; Santos and Eger, 2014; VanSandt et al., 2006). Also, Flynn (2013) research work suggested that men were more likely to steal from workplace than women. All the three male respondents interviewed admitted to stealing from the workplace, while not even one of the females interviewed admitted to involve in stealing behaviour. Women on the other hand were more inclined towards leaving work early and call in sick for no reason. Boateng et al., (2014) findings supported the assumption that demographic variables influence workers attitude towards workplace stealing, workers understanding of the causes of workplace theft and their behaviour in relation to work place stealing.

Moreover studies have shown men reporting to engage in workplace aggression (a form of DWB) more than women, thus implying gender as a strong predictor of interpersonal directed aggression than organizational directed aggression (Hershcovis et al., 2007; McFarlin

et al., 2001). While, other research showed no significant relationship between aggression and gender (Douglas et al., 2003), and still other researchers’ results showed that females were more aggressive than males (Namie and Namie, 2000). As such, meta-analysis reports addressing aggression as a form of deviant workplace behaviour, reported boys to engage more in verbal and physical aggression than girls, while there was a tendency for girls to engage in slightly more indirect aggression (Card et al., 2008). Additionally, Spector (2002) also reported males performing more than females in overall deviant workplace behaviour and interpersonal deviance, abuse and aggression scores, while there were no gender differences for organizational directed deviant workplace behaviours such as sabotage, theft or physical aggression.

The role of demographic variables in influencing deviant workplace behaviour in developing and developed economies has received a little attention. The variables identified through literature were age, gender, education, tenure, religion, position of an employee in the organization, years of employment, status of employment (part-time/fulltime), marital status of employees, culture, personality type, leadership and income levels (Appelbaum et al., 2005, 2007; Farhadi et al., 2013).

The relationship of the demographic variables with deviant workplace behaviour has remained uncertain in the past empirical researches (Berry et al., 2007; Bowling and Eschleman, 2010). Hence, the findings of demographics and deviant workplace behaviour researches have been found inconsistent throughout. For these reasons,, sociodemographics are being considered in a peculiar organisation, - The military, on a virtue that is held sacrosanct (Disobedience/mutiny)

## **METHODOLOGY**

The methodology adopted in this work has been related in a previous work (Haruna and Balogun, 2023), but its been repeated here for others who may not have access to the previous work

## Design

This study was a cross-sectional survey that adopted an ex-post facto research design. The rationale for choosing this research method is premised on the fact that the study focuses on a specific population with different socio-demographic characteristics within a specific period of time and did not engage in manipulation of any of the variables.

## Setting

The study was carried out in the Nigerian Army; only two divisions were considered because the Nigerian Army Ethical Committee agreed to grant access to only two divisions of their operation because of confidentiality in military operational architecture and military service internal and external control. After the information from the military on the limit of accessible divisions, the two divisions were then selected randomly by simple balloting, and they were Lagos State (81<sup>st</sup> Division) and Sokoto (8th Division). The headquarter 81 Division Nigerian Army located in Lagos, was formed during the colonial era. The Division which replaced the Lagos Garrison Command (LGC) came into being in 2000. It is charged with the responsibility of securing its Area of Responsibility (AOR) covering Lagos and Ogun States of Nigeria, which are the economic nerve centres of the country and also ensuring that the borders located in its AOR are secured. The Division is a mechanised infantry with affiliated combat support and combat service support units. The 8<sup>th</sup> Division of the Nigerian Army has its headquarters in Sokoto, Sokoto State. It formally started operation in the year 2017. It was established to secure Sokoto, Kebbi and Katsina States in the North Western Zone of the country and to secure its borders to avoid spread of the Boko Haram insurgency to those parts of the country. The establishment of this division secures its AOR. (Source: [www.army.mil.ng](http://www.army.mil.ng). (The Nigerian Army official website, 2018)

## Population

The population of the study was the Nigerian Army Personnel both in the 8<sup>th</sup> Division Sokoto and 81<sup>st</sup> Division Lagos. The study participant was based on the fulfilment of the following inclusion criteria.

## Inclusion Criteria:

- Participant must be a Nigerian Army Personnel.

- Participant must be working in 8<sup>th</sup> Division (Sokoto) or 81<sup>st</sup> Division (Lagos) of the Nigerian Army.
- Participant must be willing to participate in the study

## Participants

Using Yemane (1967) sampling technique, a total of four hundred and forty (440) (out of the number given as 181,000), questionnaires were distributed for the study in the 8<sup>th</sup> Division, Headquarter Sokoto and 81<sup>st</sup> Division Headquarter Lagos of the Nigerian Army respectively. Convenient sampling techniques was then used because of the nature of their work that cannot allow them to leave their duty posts. Out of the total number of questionnaires distributed, four hundred and twenty two (422) were retrieved. The study participants comprised of 362 (85.8%) Male Army Personnel, and 60 (14.2%) Female Army Personnel; their age ranged between 22-67 years with a Mean Age of 38.02 years (SD=8.65). 347 (82.2%) of the Participants are Married, 56 (13.3%) are Singles, 5 (1.2%) are Divorced, 2 (0.5%) are Separated, 11 (2.6%) are Widowed and 1 (0.2%) did not indicate their marital status. 5.5% are Warrant Officer, 12.3% are Lance Corporal, 17.3% are Capital, 3.1% are Master Warrant Officer, 10.9% are Staff Sergeant, 5.5% are Second Lieutenant, 1.2% are Colonel, 7.1% are Private, 15.6% are Lieutenant Colonel, 11.1% are Corporal, 5.2% are Major while 5.2% did not indicate their rank. 0.9% are Primary school living certificate, 1.7% are Junior Secondary School Certificate, 23.9% are Senior Secondary School Certificate, 9.5% are Technical College, 40.8% are graduates, 19.4% are Post graduates, 2.1% are National Certificate Examination (NCE), 0.2% are advanced diploma, while 1.4% did not indicate their Educational Qualification. The mean age is 38.02. The maximum age is 67. The mean years of service is 15 years while the maximum number of years in service is 34 years.

## Instruments

A structured self-administered questionnaire was used to collect relevant data in this study. The questionnaires consist of standardized scales with adequate psychometric properties. The questionnaire tapped demographic variables and other variables such as Disobedience, Job Satisfaction, Organizational Citizenship Behaviour, Inequity Sensitivity and Mutiny Proneness. They are as follows:

## SECTION A: Demographics

This section comprises of eight demographic items about the participants as follows; sex, religion, age, marital status, education, ethnicity, rank, and present job assignment.

## SECTION B: Disobedience

Disobedience was measured with the Obedient-Disobedient Tendency Scale (ODTS). It was developed by Mehta and Hasnain (1984) and it was used to find out obedient and disobedient tendency in school students. The ODTS comprised 36 items with two alternative response categories i.e. Yes or No. For any response 'yes' the subject was given the score of one and zero for 'No' response on positive statements. The scoring on negative statements was in reverse order. The maximum possible score on the test is 36 and the minimum is zero. The split-half reliability ( $N=100$ ) of the test was found to be 0.57. The test-retest temporal stability of the test was found to be 0.68. Higher scores indicate likelihood to disobey, while lower scores indicate unlikelihood to disobey. It was found reliable in this population with a Cronbach Alpha of 0.85.

## SECTION C: Job Satisfaction

Job satisfaction was measured with Job Satisfaction Survey (JSS). It was developed by Paul E. Spector in 1985. The Job Satisfaction Survey is a questionnaire used to evaluate nine dimensions of job satisfaction. This instrument is well established among the other job satisfaction scales. In order to take the test, the participants are asked to respond to 36 items for each of the nine sub-scales. For each item, there are choices between "Strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" - six choices in all, with which the participants must respond. This is a well-established instrument that has been investigated for reliability and validity. The nine sub-scales related moderately well between each other, internal consistency; a score of 0.60 for co-worker to 0.91 for the total scale. Overall, an average on 0.70 for internal consistency was obtained out of a sample of 3067 participants. High score indicates high job satisfaction while low score indicates low job satisfaction. It was found reliable in this study with a Cronbach Alpha of 0.94.

## SECTION D: Organizational Citizenship Behaviour

Organizational Citizenship Behaviour was measured in this study with the Organizational Citizenship Behaviour Checklist (OCB-C). The original Organizational Citizenship Behaviour Checklist (OCB-C) was a 42-item instrument designed to assess the frequency of organizational citizenship behaviour exhibited by employees. It has since been refined and shortened first to 36 items and then to the final 20 item scale (Fox, Spector, Goh, Bruursema & Kessler, 2012). The OCB-C was specifically designed to minimize overlap with scale of counterproductive work behaviour, a limitation noted in prior scales (Spector, Bauer, & Fox, 2010). Included were items that reflected acts directed toward the organization as well as people in the organization, such as co-workers. Some items asked about altruistic acts that helped co-workers with personal as opposed to workplace issues. Separate subscale scores can be computed that reflect acts directed towards the organization that benefit the organization (OCBO) and acts directed toward co-workers that help with work-related issues (OCBP). It was standardized for the research and used to measure the citizenship behaviour of the participants. High score indicates high Organisational citizenship behaviour while low score of the participant on the scale indicates low Organisational Citizenship Behaviour. It was found reliable in this study with a Cronbach Alpha of 0.93.

## SECTION E: Inequity Sensitivity

Inequity sensitivity was measured in this study with the Equity Sensitivity Index (ESI). The ESI was originally developed by Huseman and his colleagues in 1985, and it remains to date the most widely adopted measure. The ESI contains five items, and it asks participants to allocate 10 points between two options that respectively represent the respondent's outcome and respondent's input in each item. In the original article, the ESI demonstrated Cronbach's alpha of 0.81. Across studies, reliability of the measure has ranged from .77 to .88 (Patrick & Jackson, 1991, as cited in Shore & Strauss, 2008). To validate the measure, King and Miles (1994) examined the discriminant and convergent validity of the ESI in five samples ( $N = 2,399$ ) by correlating ESI scores with theoretically related constructs such as exchange ideology and social



desirability. Their results showed that ESI scores were positively correlated with the perceptions of pay justice, altruism, social desirability, job satisfaction organizational commitment, but negatively correlated with exchange ideology, locus of control, Machiavellianism and non-Protestant work ethic. It was standardized for the research and used to measure the sensitivity of the participants to inequity. High score of the participants on the scale implies low Inequity Sensitivity while low score implies high Inequity Sensitivity. It was found reliable in this study with a Cronbach Alpha of 0.942.

### **Pilot Study/ Scale Validation**

A pilot study was carried out to assess the workability of the procedure and to standardize all the instruments as well as to establish their psychometric properties. The pilot study was carried out in Lagos among the Army Personnel in the Ikeja Cantonment of the Nigerian Army, where fifty (50) Army Personnel were selected with the use of convenience sampling technique. The choice of the Ikeja cantonment was based on easy accessibility and availability as approved by the Nigerian Army. The test of reliability was done using the Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) software. Reliability tests carried out included item total correlational analysis, Cronbach Alpha reliability and Split-half reliability, all to ascertain internal consistency of the scales. In the

item total correlational analysis, items that loaded with a reliability coefficient of 0.3 and above were retained in the scale, while items that loaded with less than 0.3 reliability coefficients were removed.

### **Procedure**

Letter of introduction was obtained from the Department of Psychology University of Ibadan to the Nigerian Army. The letter was submitted to the Defence Headquarters Abuja and processed along with the research proposal and a letter of request to carry out research on the Nigeria Army Personnel. The approval was granted after due consideration to the confidentiality of the military system.

In carrying out the research after the approval has been granted by the appropriate authorities, questionnaires were distributed to individual Nigerian Army Personnel that shows interest in the research. The Army Personnel were briefed and all the collection of data was done with the assistance of two research assistants who were recruited for the purpose of this research. Also, many Army officers volunteered and some were saddled with the responsibility by their superior officers to collect the questionnaires after it must have been filled.

Four hundred and forty copies of questionnaires were distributed for the research of which only four hundred and twenty two were retrieved. This shows a response rate of 95.9%. The retrieved copies of questionnaire were subjected to statistical analysis.

## RESULTS

The data was subjected to a 3-way ANOVA analysis, and the result is presented in table 1 below.

Table 1: Three-way ANOVA Summary Table Showing influence of Gender, Rank and Education of Disobedience among Military Personnel

|              | Source                    | SS        | DF  | MS <sup>2</sup> | F ratio | P    |
|--------------|---------------------------|-----------|-----|-----------------|---------|------|
| Disobedience | Gender                    | 34.088    | 1   | 34.088          | .916    | >.05 |
|              | Rank                      | 550.598   | 11  | 50.054          | 1.346   | >.05 |
|              | Education                 | 376.123   | 8   | 47.015          | 1.264   | >.05 |
|              | Gender * Rank             | 305.070   | 10  | 30.507          | .820    | >.05 |
|              | Gender * Education        | 136.922   | 4   | 34.230          | .920    | >.05 |
|              | Rank * Education          | 1416.810  | 34  | 41.671          | 1.120   | >.05 |
|              | Gender * Rank * Education | 413.443   | 6   | 68.907          | 1.853   | >.05 |
|              | Error                     | 12832.616 | 345 | 37.196          |         |      |
|              | Total                     | 19877.036 | 421 |                 |         |      |

Result from table 1 showed that gender, rank and education had no significant main influence on disobedience among military personnel [(F(1, 345)= .916,  $p>.05$ ), (F(11, 345)= 1.346,  $p>.05$ ) & (F(8, 345)= 1.264,  $p>.05$ ) respectively]. Further, gender, rank and education had no significant interaction influence on disobedience among military personnel [(F(4, 345)= .920,  $p>.05$ ), (F(34, 345)= 1.120,  $p>.05$ ) & (F(6, 345)= 1.853,  $p>.05$ ) respectively]. Though there were indications of the influence of these variables, they did not approach significance,

## DISCUSSION

Contrary to expectations, none of the variables considered in this study significantly predicted disobedience among the military personnel used. The findings confirmed the observations of scholars that considering the influence of demographic variables on deviant behaviour is neither there nor

there. For example, when gender was considered, while males were reported to be more aggressive on deviant behaviours more than females in organisations (Baron et al., 1999; Hershcovis et al., 2007), others found females to be more aggressive and engage in deviant behaviours more than males (Namie and Namie, 2020), yet others

still found no difference among the genders on deviant behaviours (e.g. Douglas et al, 2003). Additionally, Spector (2002) also reported males performing more than females in overall deviant workplace behaviour and interpersonal deviance, abuse and aggression scores, while there were no gender differences for organizational directed deviant workplace behaviours such as sabotage, theft or physical aggression. The present study has just gone ahead to add to the controversy, especially in the military organisation.

The role of demographic variables in influencing deviant workplace behaviour in developing and developed economies has received a little attention. The variables identified through literature were age, gender, education, tenure, religion, position of an employee in the organization, years of employment, status of employment (part-time/fulltime), marital status of employees, culture, personality type, leadership and income levels (Appelbaum et al., 2005, 2007; Farhadi et al., 2013).

The relationship of the demographic variables with deviant workplace behaviour has remained uncertain in the past empirical researches (Berry et al., 2007; Bowling and Eschleman, 2010; Dalal, 2005;). Hence, the findings of demographics and deviant workplace behaviour researches have been found inconsistent throughout. The present researchers were expecting something different from the military organisations because of their peculiarity (where a virtue is held sacrosanct – No disobedience/mutiny), but nothing seem to have change in the equivocality of the “debate”.

Considering these demographic variables was to test the social exchange theory reviewed earlier and the submissions that sub-cultures within the organisation affect how people behave in organisations. While not refuting these submissions, the present study only added to the controversy by not confirming the influence of the variables.

In a previous work, (Haruna, 2023) actually reported predictive influence of each of these variables on disobedience, however in the presence of other variables such as Job satisfaction, organisational citizenship behaviour, inequity

sensitivity, mutiny proneness among the Nigerian army personnel. Thus, demographics (age, experience, rank & education), job satisfaction, organizational citizenship behaviour and inequity sensitivity significantly jointly predicted disobedience among military personnel. The result further revealed that only the independent contributions of experience, rank, education, job satisfaction and inequity sensitivity were significant in the general model.

It can then be concluded that the controversy would still rage on as to the influence of this variables on deviant behaviours (Disobedience) in organisations. The military in Nigeria should therefore be on the look-out to manage the situation well in their recruitment/selection processes and in managing the rank and file with knowledge in human behaviour. A psychologically based recruitment and selection system should be implemented such that candidates whose personality trait indicates they are prone to mutiny are either not recruited into the military service due to high propensity to disobedience or recruited but provided with utmost supervision to curb disobedience.

The government through relevant ministries and departments and other non-governmental organisations concerned, should conduct periodic counselling for the military personnel, enlightening them on the inimical and disparaging effect of disobedience in the military.

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